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ABSTRACT
There is currently a global, multimillion-dollar effort to experimentally confirm or falsify neuroscience’s preeminent theory of
consciousness: Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Yet, recent theoretical work suggests major epistemic concerns regarding
the validity of IIT and all so-called "causal structure theories". In particular, causal structure theories are based on the
assumption that consciousness supervenes on a particular causal structure, despite the fact that different causal structures
can lead to the same input-output behavior and global functionality. This, in turn, leads to epistemic problems when it comes to
the ability to falsify such a theory - if two systems are functionally identical, what remains to justify a difference in subjective
experience? Here, we ground these abstract epistemic problems in a concrete example of functionally indistinguishable
systems with different causal architectures. Our example comes in the form of an isomorphic feed-forward decomposition
("unfolding") of a simple electronic tollbooth, which we use to demonstrate a clear falsification of causal structure theories
such as IIT. We conclude with a brief discussion regarding the level of formal description at which a candidate measure of
consciousness must operate if it is to be considered scientific.
Introduction
If, and if so how, theories for consciousness can be brought within the purview of science is a subject of intense debate and
equally intense importance. Resolution of this debate is necessary for validating theory against experiments in human subjects.
It is also critical to recognizing and/or engineering consciousness in non-human systems such as machines. Currently, there
is a global, multi-million dollar effort devoted to scientifically validating or refuting the most promising candidate theories1,
specifically Integrated Information Theory and Global Neuronal Workspace. At the same time it is becoming increasingly
unclear whether these theories meet required scientific criteria for validating them.
Since the early 1990s, scientific studies of consciousness have primarily focused on identifying spatiotemporal patterns in
the brain that correlate with what we intuitively consider to be conscious experience. This is due in large part to advances in
medical imaging such as electroencephalograms (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that assess brain
activity during different activities (e.g., sleeping, verbal reports, etc.). The empirical data that results from such tests provide
evidence for links between spatiotemporal patterns and inferred conscious states. These links, known as Neural Correlates
of Consciousness (NCCs), are well-established and form the basis for an entire subfield of contemporary neuroscience2, 3.
Despite the success of NCCs, however, there is an underlying epistemic issue with the scientific study of consciousness
because conscious states are never directly observed in the NCC framework. Instead, they are inferred based on our own
phenomenological experience. For example, when a person is asleep we infer they are less conscious than when awake because
we have a first-hand subjective experience of being awake but not of being in deep sleep.
While this epistemic issue is widely known, Kleiner and Hoel (abbreviated herein as KH) have recently formalized the
scientific issues arising when consciousness is inferred based on correlates, rather than directly measuring it, revealing a
pervasive problem with current theoretical frameworks attempting to formalize consciousness4. Their analysis leads them
to the startling conclusion that all contemporary theories of consciousness are either already falsified or unfalsifiable. In
KH, falsification is formally defined as a mismatch between what a theory predicts based on observations, pred(O), and
what is inferred from observations, in f (O). Consequently, a theory is falsified if one can substitute a physical system for
another in a way that changes pred(O) but preserves in f (O). The authors prove such a substitution exists for all contemporary
theories of consciousness that treat inferences and observations independently including Integrated Information Theory
(IIT)5, 6, Global Neuronal Workspace7, Recurrent Processing Theory8, and Higher-Order Thought Theory9. Conversely, if a
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theory of consciousness treats inferences and predictions as strictly dependent, then the theory is necessarily unfalsifiable,
as no experiment could possibly find a mismatch between what is predicted and what is inferred. Contemporary theories of
consciousness that suffer from this issue include Global Workspace Theory10, Attention Schema Theory11, and any behaviorist
theory in general12.
The argument made by KH is actually a generalization of a previous argument made by Doerig et al., wherein the authors
focused on a particular theory (IIT) and a particular type of substitution known as "unfolding"13. According to IIT, feedback
plays an essential role in generating conscious experience. The motivation for this assumption is that, phenomenologically, we
experience consciousness as an "undivided whole", meaning, for example, that our left and right visual field are integrated
into a single conscious experience. IIT offers a mathematical measure of integration Φ that equates to the overall level of
consciousness. Integration, as a phenomenological axiom of the theory, therefore must have a direct translation in terms of
mathematical machinery. The way this is accomplished in IIT is by assuming integrated experience is mirrored by integration
of the physical substrate that gives rise to consciousness, where the latter use of the term integration has a precise mathematical
definition in terms of the presence of feedback between the physical components in a system (e.g., neurons). Consequently,
any system that is strictly feed-forward is unconscious, by definition in IIT, due to an assumed inability for such physical
structures to generate a unified subjective experience. What Doerig et al. showed was that the input-output behavior of any
conscious system with feedback and Φ> 0 can be perfectly emulated by a strictly feed-forward system with Φ= 0. To do
so, one simply needs to "unfold" the feedback present in the causal structure of the conscious system in a way that preserves
the underlying functionality of the system (i.e. the input-output behavior) - a feat that can be accomplished in the forward or
backward direction using feed-forward and recurrent neural networks, respectively13. In the formalism of KH, this unfolding
argument proved that within IIT one can always find a substitution of causal structures that preserves in f (O) but changes
pred(O), therefore falsifying the theory.
Interestingly, unfolding substitutions were known in IIT prior to the work of Doerig et al. but were not necessarily
considered detrimental. In fact, Oizumi et al. explicitly considered feed-forward substitutions in the development of IIT 3.0
but subsequently dismissed them as inconsequential. The justification for this was primarily the assumption that feedback
is a necessary condition for an "integrated experience" but, again, we stress that this assumption, known as the integration
axiom, has two distinct interpretations: the phenomenological axiom and the mathematical translation of the phenomenological
axiom. While few would argue against integration as a phenomenological axiom, the way that it is translated into mathematical
machinery is the subject of the epistemic concerns raised by the unfolding argument. In particular, how does one justify,
scientifically, that feedback is indeed what embodies the subjective experience of an integrated whole in absence of any
particular functional consequences?
In answer to this question, many authors have put forth the idea that meaningful differences can and do exist between
functionally identical systems at a formal level of description below the finite-state automaton (FSA) description of the system.
In particular, causal structure theories posit that it is the way a computation is instantiated rather than the computation in
the abstract that is relevant in determining consciousness. In a previous work, we showed that a particular instantiation of a
computation is a direct consequence of the labels that are assigned to represent the abstract functional states of a computation,
meaning that different causal structures result from different encodings of the same computation14. Because causal structure
supervenes on a particular encoding, the so-called "combinatorial-state automaton" (CSA) description of a system is nothing
more than a labeled version of the FSA description (see Fig. 1). This implies causal structure theories such as IIT are assuming
that the way a system encodes a computation is relevant to whether or not it is conscious of the computation which, in computer
science terms, is analogous to the claim that it is binary (compiled) code that determines whether or not artificially intelligent
machines are conscious rather than the abstract (functional) code being executed. Similarly, one can go one step beyond
traditional causal structure theories (which act at the CSA level) and posit that it is the specific material properties or the choice
of logical basis that is relevant for determining consciousness. In light of this hierarchy15, the main claim of the unfolding
argument and its subsequent generalization is that we must infer consciousness at the level of the FSA description of a system, as
only this level has phenomenological grounding in terms of first-hand experience. Consequently, any measure of consciousness
that is not invariant with respect to changes that preserve the FSA description of a system is either falsified or unfalsifiable,
depending on whether one assumes the inference procedure or the prediction from the theory is correct.
In this work, we seek to ground the abstract, epistemic problems associated with the unfolding argument – and indeed,
more general arguments of falsifiability - in a concrete, easily visualizable system that can readily be realized using widely
available tabletop electronics. In particular, we construct isomorphic causal structures (digital circuits) designed to operate a
simple electronic tollbooth. The utility of this approach is that it provides a clear falsification of causal structure theories such
as IIT in terms of the scale at which they operate. In other words, formalizing this epistemic hierarchy and its degeneracies in
the context of inference and prediction allows investigating not only how theories of consciousness might be falsified or are
unfalsifiable following on the work of Doerig et al.13 and KH4, but also at what level of the computational hierarchy (FSA or
CSA) a theory of consciousness is falsified or unfalsifiable.
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Figure 1. Different levels of abstraction where a computational theory of consciousness can apply. At the level of the
computation in the abstract, the topology of a finite-state automata (FSA) is specified – in this case, a mod-eight counter (left).
Encoding these abstract functional states with a specific binary representation results in a combinatorial-state automaton (CSA),
which constrains local dependencies between subcomponents within a system and is the level at which Φ is calculated (center).
To fully specify the causal structure, however, one must still choose a set of elementary logic gates to realize a given CSA
(right). In this case, we have shown two different choices for an elementary logical basis: AND/OR/NOT gates (1a, 2a) and
universal NAND gates (1b, 2b).
Results
The different levels of abstraction at which it is possible to specify a computation can be assessed explicitly for theories of
consciousness, such as IIT, by constructing automata and circuits representing different levels in the hierarchy in Fig. 1. We
do so, using the formalism we developed in14, by constructing functionally identical machines operating under the same
resource constraints using different causal architectures (circuits). We consider a very simple case of the design of a simplified
electronic tollbooth using a causal architecture with and without feedback. Focusing on feedback, as opposed to some other
difference in causal architecture, allows us to ground our results in the specifics of Integrated Information Theory (IIT), where
feedback is assumed to be a necessary condition for the presence of consciousness (i.e., Φ> 0). We focus on IIT as it is the
most mathematically rigorous theory of consciousness developed to date. However, we expect the quantitative approach to
addressing epistemic issues of falsification to also be possible for other theories of consciousness.
The qualitative description of the tollbooth’s behavior is to lift a boom barrier upon receipt of exactly eight quarters, as
shown in Fig. 2a. To do this, the circuit governing the behavior of the tollbooth must transition through eight internal memory
states, corresponding to the eight functional states in the FSA description of the machine shown in Fig. 2b). To control for
system size, we insist that both circuits are constructed on a three-bit logical architecture, which serves to enforce a strict
one-to-one correspondence (isomorphism) between the internal states of the two systems.
We will first demonstrate a "conscious" circuit with feedback (and Φ > 0), followed by a functionally identical but
"unconscious" circuit with strictly feed-forward connections (and Φ= 0). The general construction of both circuits is the same:
first, we assign binary labels to the functional states of the system; then, we map these binary state transitions onto JK flip-flops,
which are the "bits" in our digital electronics; and last, we use Karnaugh Maps to simplify the logic tables of the JK flip-flops in
a way that results in simple elementary logic gate operations (e.g. AND, OR, XOR). As we show, the presence or absence of
feedback ultimately stems from the initial choice of the binary labels used to represent or encode the functional states of the
system. For the system with feedback, we randomly assign these labels in a way that happens to result in Φ> 0 for all states.
For the feed-forward system, however, we carefully decompose the underlying dynamics in a way that exploits hierarchical
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(a) (b)
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of a simplified electronic tollbooth (2a) and its FSA description (2b). The general behavior of
the tollbooth is to lift a boom barrier upon receipt of eight quarters ($2.00). To do this requires the ability to cycle through eight
internal memory states {A,B, ...,H}, sending each internal state as output to the boom barrier. Note, for the tollbooth to
function correctly, the boom barrier must be programmed to recognize internal state A as functionally important, as this is the
output that causes the boom barrier to lift and reset.
relations such that information flow between components in the system is strictly uni-directional. The result is a "hierarchical
coordinate scheme" wherein each JK flip-flop is responsible for keeping track of a particular symmetry in the state transition
diagram of the original system.
Constructing a "Conscious" Tollbooth
The construction of any particular causal architecture requires specification of the way in which functional relationships are
physically instantiated. In other words, there are two distinct "levels" at which the functional topology can be specified: in
terms abstract states and their mathematical relations (the FSA level of description)16, or in terms of specific causal relations
between subcomponents (the CSA level of description)16. The difference between these two levels of abstraction is equivalent
in the automata formulation we present here to whether or not binary labels have been assigned to represent functional states
such as those shown in Fig. 2b. The presence of binary labels restricts the causal relationships between subcomponents within
the system, thereby constraining the causal structure.
To construct the conscious tollbooth, we randomly assign the following binary labels to represent the eight functional states
of the tollbooth:
A= 000,B= 110,C = 010,D= 101,E = 111,F = 011,G= 001,H = 100
This assignment of labels fully specifies the Boolean logic of the system, as each binary component (bit) now must transition
in accordance with the global state of the system. For example, the transition from state A to state B requires that the first
component of the system transitions from state 0 to state 1 when the system is in the global state 000. Similarly, the transition
from state B to state C specifies that the first component of the system must transition from 1 to 0 when the system is in global
state 110. Taken together, the constraints on each individual component in the system at each moment in time provide sufficient
criteria for constructing a digital circuit that governs this system. As a sidenote, we remark that for the boom barrier to function
correctly it now must be programmed to recognize the binary state A= 000 as the "$2.00 state". This means the sensorimotor
hardware of the system must be wired in such a way that it "knows" to lift the boom barrier (and reset) when there is a lack
of voltage on the three output lines coming from the circuit, which can be accomplished via an encoder/decoder device that
translates signals from the internal circuitry to the external hardware or by hardwiring the machinery of the boom barrier
directly.
To finish the construction of the causal architecture, we must specify the elementary building blocks of our system. In a
human brain, these building blocks would be neurons but in a digital circuit, these building blocks are "JK flip-flops", which are
binary memory storage devices (bits) widely used in the construction simple digital circuits17, 18. The behavior of a JK flip-flop
is quite simple: there are two stable internal states (0 and 1), two input channels (the J input and the K input), and a "clock" that
serves to synchronize multiple flip-flops within a system. Upon receipt of voltage on a line from the clock, the flip-flop does
one of four things depending on the input from the J and K channels: if the JK input is 00 the internal state remains constant
("latch"), if the JK input is 01 the internal state resets to 0 ("reset"), if the JK input is 10 the internal state is set to 1 ("set"), and
if the JK input is 11 the internal state is swapped ("toggle"). Thus, for any given internal state transition - Qi(t0)→ Qi(t1) -
there are two different possibilities for JK inputs that will correctly realize this transition, as shown in Figure 3. This degeneracy
provides much-needed flexibility when it comes to the design of the elementary logic gate operations required to actually
realize the underlying Boolean logic.
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Figure 3. A JK flip-flop is a commonly used binary storage device (bit) in digital electronics (Figure 3a). The internal state of
the flip-flop takes one of two values (Q ∈ {0,1}) and is continuously sent as output. Upon receipt of a voltage from a clocked
input, the voltages on the two input channels J and K dictate the state transitions of Q (see main). For any given state transition
Q(t0)→ Q(t1), there are two combinations of JK inputs that will correctly realize the transition (Figure 3b) which provides
much-needed flexibility when it comes to elementary logic gate descriptions.
With the specification of the binary labels and the choice of electronic components, we can now go about actually building
the digital circuit using elementary logic gates. To do so, we first convert the state transitions of each individual component into
its associated JK value. As mentioned, there is degeneracy in the choice of JK input which means we only have to specify one
of the input channels (either J or K) to get the correct transition. For each component in the circuit, there is a column in Figure
4a corresponding to the JK value that is required; note, inputs that do not need to be specified are denoted with an asterisk.
Next, we must determine the elementary logic gates required to get the correct JK values given the current state of the system.
For instance, when the system is in global state 110, the value of K1 (the K-input to the first component) must be 1, but when
the system is in global state 111 the value of K1 must be 0. Taken together, the eight states of the system comprise a truth table
of JK input as a function of the global state of the system, as shown in Figure 4b. Ordering these truth tables in gray code yields
"Karnaugh maps", which allow straightforward identification of the elementary logic gates required to operate the circuit19.
The elementary logic expression for each of the six input channels, in terms of AND,OR, XOR, and NOT gates, is shown above
the corresponding Karnaugh map in Figure 4b.
(a) (b)
Figure 4. To construct the digital circuitry for a given labeling scheme, we must convert the global state transitions into their
associated JK values (Figure 4a). Then, we use Karnaugh maps to determine the elementary logic required to correctly update
each component (Figure 4b). The presence of feedback in the resultant digital circuit is evident by the dependence of earlier
components on later components (e.g. J1 = Q1Q2 +Q3) and vice versa (e.g. K3 = Q1Q2).
The elementary logic expressions for the behavior of each JK input complete the construction of our circuit, which is
shown in Figure 5a. Clearly, this circuit contains meaningful feedback between components, as the state of the first component
depends on the state of the second and third and vis versa (e.g. J1 = Q1Q2 and K1 = Q2⊕Q3). The last thing to check is
whether or not this feedback is associated with the presence of consciousness according to IIT, as feedback is a necessary (but
not sufficient) condition for Φ> 0. Using the python package PyPhi20, we find Φ> 0 for all states (Figure 5b), meaning this
system is indeed considered conscious according to IIT.
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Figure 5. A three-bit causal architecture comprised of JK flip-flops capable of perfectly operating the electronic tollbooth
shown in Figure 2. Clearly, this system contains feedback in the form of bidirectional dependence between elements (Figure
5a). In addition, it has Φ> 0 for all states (Figure 5b) which implies it is conscious according to IIT.
Constructing an "Unconscious" Tollbooth
In the previous section, we demonstrated the construction of a causal structure with feedback that is designed to operate the
electronic tollbooth shown in Figure 2a. We did so by randomly assigning 3-bit binary labels to represent the function states
({A,B, ...,H}) of the system and constructing the logic of the digital circuit in a way that correctly realizes these labeled state
transitions. The result was a circuit that utilized feedback connections (i.e. there was bi-directional information exchange
between components) and had Φ> 0 for all states (Figure 5). In this section, we demonstrate that it is possible to assign binary
labels in a different way, such that the causal architecture that results instantiates the same functional topology (Figure 2b)
without the use of feedback. In other words, we "unfold" the underlying dynamics of the system in a way that guarantees a
causal architecture with Φ= 0 for all states in the system.
The process of unfolding a finite-state description of a system is based on techniques closely related to the Krohn-Rhodes
theorem from automata theory, which states: any abstract deterministic finite-state automata (FSA) can be realized using a
strictly feed-forward causal architecture comprised solely of simple elementary components21, 22. To do so isomorphically,
one must find a "nested sequence of preserved partitions", which creates a hierarchical labeling scheme wherein earlier
components (flip-flops) transition independently of later components14, 23. Due to this hierarchical independence, information
is guaranteed to flow unidirectionally from earlier components to later components, thereby ensuring a strictly feed-forward
logical architecture and Φ= 0 for all states. While a full discussion of Krohn-Rhodes decomposition is well beyond the scope
of this paper24, we briefly describe the relevant methodology for constructing a nested sequence of preserved partitions in the
Methods section. The result, applied to the finite-state description of the tollbooth shown in Figure 2b, is the following set of
binary labels used to represent the functional states of our system:
A= 000,B= 100,C = 010,D= 110,E = 001,F = 101,G= 011,H = 111
Notice, in this labeling scheme, the value of the first component (also called a "coordinate") partitions the underlying state
space of the system into two macrostates: {A,C,E,G} and {B,D,F,H}. These macrostates are relevant due to the fact they
transition deterministically back and forth between one another. Thus, knowing the future state of the first component depends
solely on knowing the current state of the first component. Similarly, the future state of the second component is completely
deterministic given the current state of the first and second components and is agnostic to the third. In this way, each additional
component offers a refined estimate as to where in a given macrostate the current microstate is located25, which justifies the
claim that the labeling scheme is "hierarchical".
With hierarchical labels assigned, the circuit construction now proceeds identically to the previous section. Namely, we
convert the binary state transitions into their associated JK values, shown in Figure 6a. Then, we construct truth tables for the
state of each J and K input given the global state of the system; and last, we order these truth tables in gray code (Karnaugh
Maps) and assign elementary logic gates to each input channel (Figure 6b). The resulting logical architecture is shown in Figure
7a). As required, the circuit is indeed strictly feed-forward, as evident by the fact that each component depends solely on itself
or earlier components. This, in turn, guarantees Φ = 0 for all states of the system (Figure 7b) as the presence of feedback
connections is assumed to be a necessary condition for consciousness in IIT.
Discussion
While we have presented a specific example of a feed-forward isomorphic transformation as a way to probe causal structure
theories such as IIT, the arguments and their applicability are general. We do not need to realize additional feed-forward
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Figure 6. The state transitions and JK values (Figure 6a) corresponding to the hierarchical labeling scheme described in the
main text. Figure 6b shows the Karnaugh maps used to determine the elementary logic gates used in the construction of the
feed-forward logical architecture. Note, the logical dependence between components is strictly unidirectional (e.g. J2 and K2
depend only on the state of Q1).
(a) (b)
Figure 7. The "unfolded" causal structure that results from the hierarchical labeling scheme described in the main text (Figure
7a). This strictly feed-forward causal structure operates under the same resource constraints as the feedback system (i.e. a
three-bit logical architecture) but has Φ= 0 for all states (Figure 7b).
automata emulators in a lab to know that they exist, as the Krohn-Rhodes theorem guarantees such a decomposition is always
possible. This has implications for the design of machines with "human" intelligence. Importantly, our example highlights
how the assessment of falsification depends on what level of the computational hierarchy one assumes consciousness arises
within a given theory. In our example, we can consider the implications at either the FSA or CSA level. At the level of FSAs
we provided an explicit case of equivalent computations implemented with different causal structures implemented at the
CSA level, and each CSA can further be instantiated in different circuits depending on the choice of logic gates being used.
This forms a hierarchy of supervenient computations FSA→ CSA→ circuit (Fig. 1). Recall, according to KH, a theory of
consciousness is falsified if there is a mismatch between what the theory predicts based on observation pred(O) and what
the inferred conscious experience of the system is in f (O)4. Conversely, a theory is unfalsifiable if pred(O) is dependent on
in f (O). The setup of the tollbooth example highlights how these two criteria play out in a concrete example. The tollbooth
setup carefully controls for all confounding factors, creating a situation in which everything in the automata that could be used
to infer a difference in the conscious states of the two tollbooths (e.g. behavior, functional topology, and efficiency) is fixed -
the only difference is that which emerges at the CSA level, as a consequence of the difference in labeling. Causal structure
theories are falsified at the FSA level because there is a mismatch between the inference and prediction: equivalent systems at
the FSA level can be conscious or not depending on lower-level implementations. Inferences about any differences in conscious
experience must therefore occur at the CSA level if causal structure theories. However, this is also where predictions are made
about what systems are conscious or not in causal structure theories. While this coupling of prediction and inference may
save a theory from falsification, it has the unintended consequence of rendering the theory unfalsifiable at the CSA level, as a
difference in prediction and inference (a requirement for falsification) is no longer possible (see e.g.,4 ). Thus, causal structure
theories, such as IIT, are show to be falsified at the FSA level and unfalsifiable at the CSA level.
By formalizing the epsitemic issues surrounding consciousness in the concerete mathematical formalization of automata
theory, the approach we present here enables applying the formal arguments of Kleiner and Hoel to theories of consciousness
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at specific levels of abstraction in order to test their validity. Not the least of which is that it directly connects validation
of theories for consciousness to foundations of computer science. The formalization we present is, in fact, is a concrete
mathematical analysis of the Turing test: at the FSA level our machines are Turing indistinguishable. It is only in the assignment
of representation (labeling) that they become distinguishable. Thus, our unconscious tollbooth could be said to pass the Turing
test at the FSA level. Furthermore, our focus on isomorphisms supports prior proposals that the measurement of "isomorphic
experiences", which differ in content but not overall quality of experience, may indeed be possible - even if the subjectivity of
the experience itself is not. To approach analyzing such isomorphic physical systems (humans and/or machines) one must
find a level of abstraction that is invariant between two physical implementations. There is a direct correspondence between a
FSA - conventionally called a deterministic finite-state automaton (DFA) - description of a behavior and the algebraic theory
of semigroups. Namely, every DFA maps directly onto a transformation semi-group, which implies the rich mathematics of
semigroup theory may be relevant in ascertaining the mathematical structure of phenomenological experience. Semigroup
measures such as the group complexity act at the level of the abstract transformation semigroup (corresponding to an abstract
DFA) and are therefore invariant with respect to changes in the causal architectures and/or material properties that instantiate
a given computation26. In addition, such measures would capture much of the intuitive notions associating consciousness
with complexity (such is at the heart of IIT27). However, it is not clear if such a framework could avoid ultimately issues of
falsification. For that, new ideas about theories of consciousness may be needed which must be directed not at measuring
experience itself, but instead whether or not the physical act of having a conscious experience leads to meaningful causal
differences in the implementation of computations across different levels of abstraction and implementation.
Methods
Isomorphic Unfolding via Preserved Partitions
The Krohn-Rhodes theorem guarantees that any finite-state transition diagram can be "unfolded" such that the resultant causal
architecure is feedback free and has Φ= 0. Typically, however, this unfolding process results in a causal architecture that is
much larger than the minimum number of bits to instantiate the functional topology of the system using feedback. In other
words, Krohn-Rhodes decomposition, and other unfolding methodologies6, 13, inevitably result in a clear difference in efficiency
between feed-forward and recurrent representations of the same underlying computation. To control for this, we must find
a system that allows an isomorphic feed-forward representation, which can be done using a nested sequence of preserved
partitions.
A preserved partition is a way of grouping microscopic states into macroscopic equivalence classes (blocks) based on
symmetries present in dynamics. In particular, a partition P is preserved if it breaks the microscopic state space S into a set of
blocks P= {B1,B2, ...,BN} such that every microstate within a given block transitions to the same macrostate (i.e. the same
block)23, 28. If we denote the underlying microscopic dynamics as a function f : S→ S, then a block Bi is preserved when:
∃ j ∈ {1,2, ...,N} such that f (x) ∈ B j∀x ∈ Bi
In other words, for Bi to be preserved, ∀x in Bi x must transition to some state in a single block B j (i= j is allowed). Conversely,
Bi is not preserved if there exist two or more states in Bi that transition to different blocks (i.e. ∃ x1,x2 ∈ Bi such that f (x1) = B j
and f (x2) = Bk with j 6= k ). In order for the entire partition Pi to be preserved, each block within the partition must be
preserved.
For an isomorphic cascade decomposition to exist, we must be able to heirarchically construct preserved partitions in a
maximally efficient way. Namely, each partition in the nested sequence of preserved partitions ({P1,P2, ...,PN}) must consist
of blocks that evenly split the blocks in the partition above it in half. If this is the case, then a single bit of information can
be used to specify where in the preceding block the current state is located. This, in turn, allows a straightforward mapping
from the blocks of the preserved partition Pi onto the first i binary coordinates used to represent these blocks. Thus, a system
with 2n microstates requires only n binary components, meaning the representation is maximally compact. If one cannot find a
preserved partition made of disjoint blocks or the blocks of a given partition do not evenly split the blocks of the partition above
it in half, then the system in question does not allow an isomorphic feed-forward decomposition and traditional Krohn-Rhodes
decomposition techniques23, 24, 29 must be employed.
To isomorphically decompose the finite-state automaton shown in Figure 2b, we let our first preserved partition be
P1 = {B0,B1} with B0 = {A,C,E,G} and B1 = {B,D,F,H}. It is easy to check that this partition is preserved, as one can
verify that every element in B0 transitions to an element in B1 and every element in B1 transitions to an element in B0 (shown
topologically in Figure 8). To keep track of the blocks, we assign all the states in B0 a binary coordinate value of Q′1 = 0 and all
the states in B1 a binary coordinate value of Q′1 = 1, which serves as the first of the three binary components (Q
′
1Q
′
2Q
′
3) assigned
to represent the global state of the system. The logic of the first coordinate is given by the corresponding state transitions of the
blocks in P1. Since block 0 goes to 1 and vis versa, the first component is essentially a NOT gate taking input from itself, or a
JK flip-flop receiving a "toggle" signal.
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The second preserved partition P2 must evenly split each block within P1, such that every block in P2 is half the size of the
blocks in P1. Denoting P2 = {{B00,B01},{B10,B11}}, we let B00 = {A,E}, B01 = {C,G}, B10 = {B,F}, and B11 = {D,H}.
One can quickly check that these blocks are indeed preserved, and that the component logic for Q′2 (based on the state of Q
′
1Q
′
2)
is given by: {00→ 0;01→ 1;10→ 1;11→ 0}. In a single-channel input scheme, this corresponds to Q′2 as an XOR gate (i.e.
Q′2 = Q
′
1⊕Q′2 but, again, the two channel logic corresponding to a JK flip-flop will differ slightly.
The third and final partition P3 must also split the blocks of P2 in half, which implies each of the eight states corresponds
to its own block in P3. Naturally, this partition is preserved since there is only a single state in each block (making it
impossible for two states within a given block to transition to separate blocks). Since P3 is at the bottom of the hierarchy, the
state of Q′3 can depend on the global state of the system (Q
′
1Q
′
2Q
′
3). Unlike the previous two coordinates, this truth table is
too large to be captured with a single elementary logic gate (e.g. NOT,XOR,etc.). Instead, we must rely on a combination
of elementary logic gates, which is drastically simplified by the use of JK flip-flops. Indeed, it is this third coordinate
(and the potential for more complicated logical descriptions in general) that motivated our use of two channel flip-flops
rather than single channel devices (e.g. D flip-flops). Reading the block transitions off of the bottom of Figure 8, we have
{000→ 0;001→ 0;010→ 1;011→ 1;100→ 0;101→ 0;110→ 1;111→ 1}. Clearly, there is no single binary logic gate that
implements this truth table, and we must instead refer to the Karnaugh maps shown in Figure 4b.
Figure 8. A nested sequence of preserved partitions {P1,P2,P3} used to isomorphically decompose or "unfold" the dynamics
underlying the finite-state description of the tollbooth shown in Figure 2. Blocks within any given partition transition
deterministically, which implies the logic for individual components can be constructed hierarchically. The binary labels
assigned to the blocks of P3 correspond to a labeling scheme that is isomorphic to the original and strictly feed-forward (see
main).
At this point, the isomorphic cascade decomposition is complete. The values assigned to the blocks of Q3 correspond to our
new binary labeling scheme, namely:
A= 000,B= 100,C = 010,D= 110,E = 001,F = 101,G= 011,H = 111
As demonstrated in the main text, these labels result in a causal architecture that is strictly feed-forward and has Φ= 0 for
all states, as desired. This can easily be seen by the fact that the transitions of blocks in any given level of the nested sequence of
preserved partitions are fully deterministic without the need to specify lower levels (Figure 8). Thus, downstream information
from later coordinates is inconsequential to the action of earlier coordinates, which enforces the "hierarchical" relationship
between components. Note, this result is by no means unique; there are other nested sequences of preserved partitions for this
system that are equally valid. Choosing a different nested sequence of preserved partitions simply amounts to changing the
labels assigned to each block which, in turn, changes the Boolean logic governing the system. As long as the partitions are
preserved, however, the causal architecture that results is guaranteed to be strictly feed-forward and isomorphic to the logical
architecture we present.
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